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TREES THAT FALL IN THE FOREST:
THE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT OF
UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS
I lzow of no phase of our law so misunderstood as our system of
precedent. I
[fIt will readily be conceived fiom the variety of controversies
which grow out of the folly and wickedness of mankind, that the rec-
ords of those precedents must unavoidably swell to a very consider-
able bulk, and must demand long and laborious study to acquire a
competent lnowledge of them.
2
[Stare decisis seemingly operates with the randomness of a
lightening bolt: on occasion it may strike, but when and where can
be known only after the fact.
3
INTRODUCTION
Lawyers and law students know not to spend time searching for
an unpublished opinion to cite as authority. Some court rules ex-
pressly prohibit the citation of unpublished opinions altogether,
while others declare them merely persuasive authority.4 If retrieved
through LEXIS and Westlaw, many unpublished opinions announce
the nature of their limited use and precedential value in the eyes of
the issuing court; others are practically impossible to locate. If a
relevant unpublished opinion is found, it is likely that it will be
1. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COmMON LAW TRADITION, DECIDING
APPEALS 62 (1960).
2. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), reprinted in 4 THE
PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 662 (Harold C. Syrett & Jacob E. Cooke
eds., 1962).
3. Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication,
88 COLUM. L. REv. 723, 743 (1988).
4. See infta note 18 and accompanying text (listing no-citation rules
among various federal circuits).
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exceedingly short, lacking both factual background and possibly the
court's rationale.
Recently, however, the rules creating unpublished opinions have
been called into question by both federal and state courts alike. For
example, the Ninth Circuit recently relaxed its rules prohibiting the
citation of unpublished opinions,5 while the Texas Supreme Court
has planned to review its own rules for some time.6 According to
Texas Supreme Court Chief Justice Tom Phillips, "[i]t's become a
big issue having cases available that you can't cite."'7 The Texas
court's decision to review its court rules has received a strong boost
of support from a recent Eighth Circuit decision.
In Anastasoffv. United States,8 a three-judge panel of the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals handed down a controversial decision in
what the litigants thought was a routine tax case.9 Although neither
party challenged the constitutionality of unpublished opinions, the
court followed an unpublished opinion as binding precedent and then
declared its own no-citation rule unconstitutional. The Anastasoff
opinion, written by Circuit Judge Richard S. Arnold, has been
5. See 9TH CIR. R. 36-3 ("Circuit Rule 36-3 has been adopted for a limited
30-month period, beginning July 1, 2000 and ending December 31, 2002.
Litigants are invited to submit comments regarding the rule to the Clerk during
the first 24 months of the trial period. After the rule has been in effect for 24
months, the Advisory Committee on Rules will study and report to the Court
on the frequency with which unpublished dispositions are cited to the Court
and on any problems or concerns associated with the rule .... Unless, by De-
cember 31, 2002, the Court votes affirmatively to extend the rule, it will auto-
matically expire on December 31, 2002 and the former version of Circuit Rule
36-3, prohibiting citation of dispositions under all circumstances will be rein-
stated.").
6. See Mary Alice Robbins, Unpublished No More? All Cases May Soon
Be Citable, TEx. LAW., Oct. 30, 2000, at 4.
7. Id.
8. 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated as moot en banc, No. 99-3917,
2000 WL 183092 (8th Cir. Dec. 18, 2000).
9. See Steve France, Swift En Banc Review Expected of Case Treating
Unpublished Opinions as Precedent, 69 U.S. L. WK. 2227, 2228 (2000).
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called "impeccably reasoned."' 0 After Anastasoff, the constitution-
ality and nonprecedential status of unpublished opinions is an open
question."
This Note examines both the controversy surrounding limited
publication-the system by which opinions are designated "unpub-
lished"--and the no-citation rules that limit their ability to be cited.
Specifically, this Note addresses why limited publication is a trou-
bled system. It also questions whether courts should adopt the
Anastasoff case rationale, requiring adherence to unpublished opin-
ions. Part I briefly examines the history of the modem "experiment"
with limited publication in the federal circuits. Part II presents some
of the practical and theoretical problems of limited publication. Part
Ill examines the rationale of the Anastasoff case directly. Part IV
demonstrates why the Anastasoff rationale is unlikely to be adopted
by other federal appellate and state courts. Finally, Part V offers
thoughts and suggestions on the future of limited publication.
I. BACKGROUND: THE FEDERAL EXPERIMENT WITH
UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS AND No-CITATION RULES
Unpublished opinions are not new to the American legal system.
During the early years of the Republic, lawyers and judges often re-
lied upon their memory of court decisions or upon the unpublished
notes of lawyers. 12 In fact, until relatively recently, case reporting
had been a private and "haphazard enterprise."' 13 As early as the
10. Howard J. Bashman, A Closer Look. The Unconstitutionality of Non-
Precedential Appellate Rulings, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 11, 2000, at 7
("[T]hat decision presented an impeccably reasoned explanation of why the
U.S. Constitution prohibits federal appellate courts from denying precedential
effect to their opinions. If you doubt the soundness of that ruling.... those
doubts will disappear once you review the opinion .... ").
11. On December 18, 2000, the Eighth Circuit issued an en banc ruling in
the Anastasoff case, vacating the earlier decision on other grounds, while spe-
cifically calling the constitutional matter of unpublished opinions an "open
question." Anastasoffv. United States, No. 99-3917, 2000 WL 1863092, at *2
(8th Cir. Dec. 18, 2000) (en banc).
12. See Jesse Root, The Origin of Government and Laws in Connecticut,
1798, reprinted in THE LEGAL MIND IN AMERICA: FROM INDEPENDENCE TO
THE CIVIL WAR 38 (Perry Miller ed., 1962).
13. William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, An Evahtation of Limited
Publication in the United States Courts ofAppeals: The Price of Reform, 48 U.
.April 2001] 1257
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1790s and continuing until as late as 1887, private individuals col-
lected and reported cases for profit. 4 Even the Supreme Court was
subject to poor reporting standards, including: publications with
numerous typographical errors, failure to print dissenting opinions,
and in some cases, failure to print opinions altogether.15
What is "new and radical" about the modem system of limited
publication is that it grants the judge deciding a case the discretion-
ary power to issue an unpublished opinion.' 6 The appeals before a
court are not frivolous, 17 yet, under the rules of limited publication, a
court may choose to limit the ability of an opinion to be cited 18 in
CHI. L. REv. 573, 575 (1981) [hereinafter Reynolds & Richman, An Evahta-
tion].
14. See id. at 576 n.10 (citing Samuel Blatchford, who reported Second
Circuit decisions until the Federal Reporter finally put him out of business in
1887).
15. See id. at 576 nn.9-11.
16. See id. at 577.
17. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS, CRISIS AND REFORM
122 (1985).
18. See, e.g., 2D CIR. R. 0.23 (stating that unreported cases shall not be
cited); 3D CIR. I.O.P. 5.3 (stating that opinions of value only to the trial court
and the parties are designated unreported and non-precedential); 4TH CIR. R.
36(c) (stating that citation of unpublished dispositions is disfavored, except for
the purpose of establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case); 5TH
CIR. R. 47.5.3 (stating that unpublished opinions issued before January 1,
1996, are precedent but should normally be cited only when the doctrine of res
judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case is applicable); 5TH CIR. R.
47.5.4 (stating that unpublished opinions issued after January 1, 1996, may be
persuasive authority); 6TH CIR. R. 206(c) (stating that published panel opinions
are binding); 7TH CIR. R. 53(b)(2)(iv) (stating that unpublished opinions shall
not be cited or used as precedent, except to support a claim of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case); 8TH CIR. R. 28(i) (stating that un-
published opinions are not precedent and parties generally should not cite them
except when relevant to establishing res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law
of the case when they may be cited for persuasive value); 9TH CIR. R. 36-3
(stating that unpublished dispositions may be cited for res judicata, collateral
estoppel, the law of the case, or for factual purposes, to show double jeopardy,
sanctionable conduct, entitlement to attorneys' fees, existence of a related case,
or to show conflict among opinions, dispositions, or orders); 10TH CIR. R.
36.3(B)(1), (2) (stating that citation of unpublished decisions is disfavored but
that they may be cited if they have persuasive value with respect to a material
issue that has not been addressed in a public opinion or would assist the court
in its disposition); 11TH CIR. R. 36-2 (stating that unpublished opinions are not
binding precedent, but they may be cited as persuasive authority provided a
copy is attached).
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subsequent cases while possibly casting it into oblivion.'9 Limiting
the citation of a case merely because it is unpublished involves a pre-
sumption that the case is of no precedential value whatsoever. But
saying an unpublished case does not set precedent does not make it
so. And prohibiting its citation just might be unconstitutional.'
The current system creating unpublished opinions and no-
citation rules in the federal courts traces back to 1964. That year, in
response to a growing crisis of overburdened courts, the Judicial
Conference of the United States recommended "[t]hat the judges of
the courts of appeals and the district courts authorize the publication
of only those opinions which are of general precedential value and
that opinions authorized to be published be succinct."22 This rec-
ommendation did not result in any concrete changes until a decade
later when the matter was taken up again by a distinguished commis-
sion of lawyers, law professors, and judges brought together by the
Federal Judicial Center.
23
The commission was formed in direct response to the concern
that the courts would be unable to handle their increasingly heavy
caseloads.24 It issued an influential report under the title Standards
for Publication, in which it was observed that judges ranked opinion-
writing as the second most significant cause of delay in the courts.2
Writing opinions, it was said, took more time than hearing argu-
ments, holding conferences, conducting research, or other
19. See, e.g., Re Rules of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit, 955 F.2d 36, 37 (10th Cir. 1986) (Holloway, C.J., dissenting) ("[AII
rulings of this court are precedents, like it or not, and we cannot consign any of
them to oblivion by merely banning their citation."); see also infra Part II.B.1-
2 (discussing the concept of secret law).
20. But see Alex Kozinski & Stephen Reinhardt, Please Don 't Cite This!
Wyzy We Don 't Allow Citation To Unpublished Dispositions, CAL. LAwV., June
2000, at 43, 81 (arguing that unpublished opinions only have as much prece-
dential value as the judges intended to give them).
21. See Anastasoff v. United States, No. 99-3917, 2000 WL 1863092 (8th
Cir. Dec. 18, 2000) (en banc).
22. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES REPORT 11 (1964).
23. See COMM. ON USE OF APPELLATE COURT ENERGIES, ADVISORY
COUNCIL FOR APPELLATE JUSTICE, STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION OF
JUDICIAL OPINIONS preface (1973) [hereinafter STANDARDS FOR
PUBLICATION].
24. See id.
25. See id. at 1.
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miscellaneous duties.26 The commission recommended that "[i]f a
tentative determination can be made at a very early stage in the proc-
ess of decision-making that a case is one that does not warrant a
published opinion, drafting will be facilitated.' 2 7 Reducing the num-
ber of cumbersome opinions should lighten the judge's load and as-
sist in speeding up the judicial process. The commission explained:
Non-published opinions can be short. They do not need to
cite all of the law, and can deal mainly with facts as they
relate to law. They can be written especially for the parties.
They need not be polished. On the other hand, opinions
that are designated for publication will, under the standards,
involve cases that have broader importance; therefore the
written expression of the court's decision deserves more
intensive craftmanship [sic].28
Thus, it was urged that the net benefits of limited publication would
include: saving the judge and the appellate court time in writing a
polished opinion; saving the lawyer time in researching opinions; re-
ducing the logistical burden on the court, lawyers and law libraries;
reducing the burden on the publishing industry; and reducing the dif-
ficulty in locating precedent.29
The commission formulated a Model Rule,30 which became the
basis for limited publication rules throughout the federal circuits.
31
According to the 1974 Judicial Conference Report, variation among
the circuit court rules would create a welcomed experiment with
limited publication. The commission wrote:
While the plans of each circuit generally follow the basic
recommendations of the report ... each circuit, to a limited
extent is experimenting with respect to some phases of its
plan. There are in effect 11 legal laboratories accumulat-
ing experience and amending their publication plans on the
basis of that experience. Because the possible rewards of
such experimentation are so rich, the Conference agreed
26. See id. at preface.
27. Id. at 5.
28. Id.
29. See id. at 6-8.
30. See id. at 22-23.
31. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES REPORT 12 (1974).
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that it should not be discontinued until there is considerably
more experience under the diverse circuit plans.
32
These plans became the basis for the system that is in place today.
33
II. THE PROBLEMS OF LIMITED PUBLICATION
The Anastasofi, 4 case comes at a time when seventy-eight per-
cent of the case dispositions by federal appeals courts are already
unpublished. 35 Nevertheless, the problems identified in the 1960s
and 1970s for which limited publication was to be a solution have
still not been resolved. According to the 1990 Report of the Federal
Courts Study Committee to the Judicial Conference of the United
States, the "crisis of volume is beyond dispute."36 This overload is
largely to blame on a heightened proclivity to appeal district court
decisions. For example, in 1945, litigants appealed approximately
one out of every forty district court decisions.37 By contrast, in 1990,
one in eight cases were appealed, resulting in a fifteen-fold in-
crease.38 During the same years, the number of appellate judgeships
only increased by a factor of less than three.39 The heavy burden
upon individual judges and appellate panels remains uncorrected,
raising the specter of ongoing delays and inferior work.40
Commentators on the limited publication system frequently cite
statistics reflecting the sheer bulk of published opinions already pro-
duced today. In 1996 alone, in spite of the enormous volume of
32. Id. (emphasis added).
33. See Reynolds & Richman, An Evaluation, supra note 13, at 579.
34. Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated as
moot en banc, No. 99-3917, 2000 WL 183092 (8th Cir. Dec. 18, 2000).
35. See Tony Mauro, Judge Ignites Storm Over Unpublished Opinions,
FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., Sept. 5, 2000, available at LEXIS, U.S. News
Library, Combined File (citing statistics of the Administrative Office of the
U.S. Courts).
36. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE
FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITrEE 110 (1990) [hereinafter 1990 REPORT
OF THE FEDERAL CoURTS].
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. See Hon. Boyce F. Martin, Jr., Judges on Judging: In Defense of Un-
published Opinions, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 177, 183 (1999) ("An even greater
problem than the workload is the quality of the work.").
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unpublished opinions, the Federal Reporter grew in size by thirty
volumes, filling more than 45,000 pages with published appellate
opinions.4 1 Proponents of limited publication suggest that these
numbers simply reflect "too much written material creating too little
new law."4 2 As Chief Judge Boyce Martin of the Sixth Circuit re-
cently wrote, limited publication "separates the diamonds from the
dross. ' 43 Opinions that merely apply existing law to new litigants
are said to be of value only to the litigants themselves. 4 Thus, not
all cases merit publication.45
The 1990 Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee sig-
naled a possible retreat from limited publication. The Report stated
that the system of limited publication and restricted citation has "al-
ways been a concession to perceived necessity., 46 While the Report
acknowledged that the sheer bulk of cases prohibits the universal
publication of many of those opinions that merely require the appli-
cation of established law, the Report also recommended that the Ju-
dicial Conference review the policy on unpublished opinions. 47 Al-
though the Report was not specific, it noted that the limited
publication policies and no-citation rules "present many problems."
48
A. The Purpose of the Written Opinion
Before examining the shortcomings and flaws unique to limited
publication, it is necessary to recognize the reasons why a written
opinion is so important to the disposition of a case. First, the written
opinion permits the parties and their attorneys to see that the court
has considered the parties' positions and arguments through disclo-
sure of its reasoning and conclusion.49 Second, the process of com-
mitting ideas to paper helps each judge to clarify and organize his or
41. See id. at 177.
42. Id. But see POSNER, supra note 17, at 122 (explaining how the no-
citation rules make unpublished opinions unworthy of publication).
43. Martin, supra note 40, at 191.
44. See id. at 189.
45. See id.
46. 1990 REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 36, at 130 (empha-
sis added).
47. See id.
48. Id.
49. See STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION, supra note 23, at 2.
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her thoughts.50 This places a check on the judge's intuition and al-
lows the judge to see whether his or her ideas "will write." Third,
the judicial opinion provides "the stuff of law: to permit an under-
standing of legal doctrine, and to accommodate legal doctrine to
changing conditions." 51  Fourth, the court's opinion serves as a
teaching device, educating those in the legal profession and inform-
ing those in society with special obligations as to what actions con-
form to the law.52  Fifth, as some commentators have expressed,
"[j]ustice must not only be done, it must also appear to be done"; a
written opinion tells the public at large that a case has actually been
checked and given fair consideration.
5 3
B. Shortcomings and Flaws ofLimited Publication
1. Unpublished "secret law"
In the debate surrounding limited publication, the notion that
unpublished opinions create secret law is frequently heard. For ex-
ample, in a dissent to a 1985 Supreme Court case,54 Justice John Paul
Stevens wrote, "[the Ninth Circuit's] decision not to publish [its]
opinion or permit it to be cited-like the decision to promulgate a
rule spawning a body of secret law-was plainly wrong." 55 It is easy
50. See id.
51. Id. at 2-3.
52. See id. at 3.
53. William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, The Non-Precedential
Precedent-Limited Publication and No-Citation Rules in the United States
Courts of Appeals, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1167, 1175 (1978) [hereinafter Rey-
nolds & Richman, Non-Precedential Precedent].
54. See County of Los Angeles v. Kling, 474 U.S. 936, 937 (1985) (Stev-
ens, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 938 (Stevens, J, dissenting). In Kling, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari and in a one-sentence summary disposition reversed the decision of
the Ninth Circuit. See id. at 936 (Stevens, J, dissenting). The case involved a
claim that the plaintiff was wrongly denied admission to the County of Los
Angeles School of Nursing. See id. at 937 (Stevens, J, dissenting). Stevens
expressed the concern that the Ninth Circuit opinion, which was initially issued
as an unpublished opinion but reissued as a published opinion two days after
certiorari was granted, failed to explain the reasons for its holding. See id. at
938 (Stevens, J, dissenting). Stevens suggested that the Supreme Court's un-
usually short disposition of the case might therefore be partly to blame on the
inadequate record before it. See id. (Stevens, J, dissenting).
A,.- 2001].Vril 1263
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to see how limited publication can spawn secret law. Under the sys-
tem of limited publication, judges have the discretion to decide
whether a particular opinion is worthy of publication. 6 If deemed
unworthy of publication, the opinion may be either unattainable or
uncitable.57 And if the unpublished opinion cannot be cited before
the court, it is effectively nonexistent in the eyes of the court. The
prospect of judges exercising broad discretion under the auspices of
limited publication in order to sweep difficult issues under the rug by
inappropriately designating an opinion unpublished is frightening. 
5 8
2. Overuse of limited publication
Supporters of limited publication properly point out that the
worst-case scenario fears of secret law are overstated.5 9 That the
mere opportunity for abuse exists is not a sufficient reason to reform
the system. The debate should be refocused away from the specter
of the worst-case-scenario to the frequent overuse of limited publi-
cation creating uncitable precedent. A few notable cases have drawn
56. See, e.g., STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION, supra note 23, at 10 (asserting
that "[u]nless directed by a higher court, opinions should be published only if a
majority of the judges participating in the decision determine that publication
is required").
57. See Re Rules of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Cir-
cuit, 955 F.2d 36, 37 (10th Cir. 1986) (Holloway, C.J., dissenting).
58. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 17, at 123 (noting that an argument for
publishing all opinions is that "the unpublished opinion provides a temptation
for judges to shove difficult issues under the rug, in cases where a one-liner
would be too blatant an evasion of judicial duty"); Martha J. Dragich, Will the
Federal Courts of Appeal Perish if they Publish? Or Does the Declining Use
of Opinions to Explain and Justify Judicial Decisions Pose a Greater Threat?,
44 AM. U. L. REV. 757, 787 (1995) (noting that selective publication makes it
difficult to assess the clarity of the law or the complexity of the legal issues by
creating secret law); Reynolds & Richman, An Evaluation, supra note 13, at
608 (detailing the problem of cases involving constitutional issues that were
unpublished).
59. See, e.g., France, supra note 9, at 2229 (quoting Ninth Circuit Judge
Alex Kozinski, who refuted the notion that limited publication is used to sweep
difficult issues under the rug: "I can't say no judges have ever said, 'oh let's
just hold our nose and affirm it, even though if we had to publish we'd go the
other way,' but I can't think of a single time it's [sic] happened."); Robert J.
Martineau, Restrictions on Publication and Citation of Judicial Opinions: A
Reassessment, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 119, 129 (1994) (arguing that the
risks of a secret law existing is overstated).
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criticism from the justices and judges involved in the process of re-
viewing unpublished decisions.
In United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co.,60 the Supreme Court
reversed a Fourth Circuit decision in which the court of appeals
found that federal restrictions forbidding the advertising of lotteries
on television violated the First Amendment guarantee of free
speech.61 Writing for a seven-member majority of the Court, Justice
Byron White criticized the Fourth Circuit's disposition of a case in-
volving constitutional questions in an unpublished opinion. "We
deem it remarkable and unusual," White wrote, "that although the
Court of Appeals affirmed a judgment that an Act of Congress was
unconstitutional as applied, the court found it appropriate to an-
nounce its judgment in an unpublished per curiam opinion."
62
In National Classification Committee v. United States,63 a case
involving a second appeal from an unpublished opinion, Circuit
Judge Patricia Wald strongly criticized the decision of the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia not to publish. 4 Judge Wald
stressed that because the original case involved a matter of first im-
pression with a substantial question of statutory interpretation it
should have been published.65 In National Classification Committee,
the petitioners sought review of two Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion decisions they contended exceeded the Commission's statutory
66authority. Resolution of the matter, Judge Wald said, "requires an
examination of Congress' purpose and intent." 67 Under these cir-
cumstances, "a published opinion setting forth the court's analysis
and reasoning for upholding the Commission, and establishing a
precedent applicable to all [similarly situated parties], not just peti-
tioners, should... have been written."
68
Branding an opinion unpublished can have the detrimental effect
of creating uncitable law or inadvertently hiding from view
60. 509 U.S. 418 (1993).
61. Seeid. at425.
62. Id. at 425 n.3.
63. 765 F.2d 164 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
64. See id. at 172-75.
65. See id. at 174.
66. See id. at 164.
67. Id. at 174.
68. Id.
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important cases involving novel questions and even constitutional
matters.69 In this context, "secret" need not suggest a conspiracy to
hide, but rather a body of important law "practically inaccessible to
many lawyers."
70
3. Inferior opinions
In the interest of time, the unpublished opinion is, by definition,
supposed to be shorter and less polished than a formally published
opinion. 7 1 It is also widely acknowledged, however, that unpub-
lished opinions are simply inferior in quality to published ones.72
More important than the prevalence of bad grammar or misspelled
words is the lack of substantive quality. According to William Rey-
nolds and William Richman, who have studied limited publication
more than anyone else, some unpublished opinions "are so short that
69. Court rules provide specific guidance when an opinion should be pub-
lished. For example, the D.C. Circuit holds that an opinion will be published if
it meets one or more of the following criteria:
(A) with regard to a substantial issue it resolves, it is a case of first
impression;
(B) it alters, modifies, or significantly clarifies a rule of law previ-
ously announced by the court;
(C) it calls attention to an existing rule of law that appears to have been
generally overlooked;
(D) it criticizes or questions existing law;
(E) it resolves an apparent conflict in decisions within the circuit or cre-
ates a conflict with another circuit;
(F) it reverses a published agency or district court decision, or affirms a
decision of the district court upon grounds different from those set
forth in the district court's published opinion;
(G) it warrants publication in light of other factors that give it general
public interest.
As Judge Wald made clear publication criteria are not always followed. See
Nat ' Classification Comm., 765 F.2d at 174.
70. Id. at 173 n.2; see also Reynolds & Richman, An Evaluation, supra note
13, at 608 (noting that they discovered "no widespread 'hiding' of law-
declaring opinions," but there were definitely "some exceptions").
71. See STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION, supra note 23, at 5.
72. See Reynolds & Richman, An Evaluation, supra note 13, at 598 (stating
that "[a]nyone who has read a large number of unpublished opinions must con-
clude that they are, as a group, far inferior in quality to the opinions [pub-
lished] in the Federal Reporter"); see also POSNER, supra note 17, at 124
(stating that "[t]he federal courts of appeals have adapted to the caseload ex-
plosion in part by reducing the quality of their output").
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they raise serious questions concerning the exercise of judicial re-
sponsibility."
73
In order to determine whether these exceedingly brief opinions
satisfy the court's exercise of judicial responsibility, Reynolds and
Richman evaluated unpublished opinions in relation to the "essential
characteristics of the judicial opinion., 7 4  They suggest that the
"minimum standards" an opinion should meet are: (1) the identity of
the case decided; (2) the ultimate disposition; and (3) the reasons for
the result.75 It is the latter of these that raises the most problems.
76
In their analysis, Reynolds and Richman compiled statistics from the
various circuits assessing the percentage of unpublished opinions
which were (1) clearly reasoned; (2) decided on the basis of the
opinion below; or (3) decided with no discemable justification." Of
these, the third category most strikingly raises the issue of judicial
irresponsibility.78 Their results ranged from a low 7.4% of unpub-
lished opinions without a discemable rationale within the Tenth Cir-
cuit to an astoundingly high 85.2% within the Third Circuit.79 Of
this problem generally, they observed:
A decision without articulated reasons might well be a deci-
sion without reasons or one with inadequate or impermissi-
ble reasons. That is not to suggest that judges will be
73. Reynolds & Richman, An Evaluation, supra note 13, at 600-01.
74. Id. at 601; see also supra Part II.A (describing the purpose of the judi-
cial opinion).
75. See Reynolds & Richman, An Evaltation, supra note 13, at 601.
76. See, e.g., LLEWELLYN, supra note 1, at 26. Llewellyn described the
important reason for stating the rationale for a decision:
The deciding is, in the main, done under felt pressure or even compul-
sion to follow up with a published 'opinion' which tells any interested
person what the cause is and why the decision-under the authori-
ties-is right, and perhaps why it is wise.... This opinion is ad-
dressed also to the losing party and counsel in an effort to make them
feel at least that they have had a fair break.
Id.
77. See Reynolds & Richman, An Evahation, supra note 13, at 602 tbl.10.
78. See id. at 603.
79. See id. at 602 tbl.10. Reportedly, the Third Circuit has made a con-
certed effort to reduce the number of judgment orders it issues and no longer
has the "dubious distinction" of issuing the most opinions without an articu-
lated rationale. See Howard J. Bashman, 3rd Circuit Should Use Judgment
Orders Wisely, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 8, 2001, at 9.
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deliberately arbitrary or decide cases without adequate
grounds. The discipline of providing written reasons, how-
ever, often will show weaknesses or inconsistencies in the
intended decision that may compel a change in the rationale
or even in the ultimate result. Even if judges conscien-
tiously reach correct results, an opinion that does not dis-
close its reasoning is unsatisfactory. Justice must not only
be done, it must appear to be done. The authority of the
federal judiciary rests upon the trust of the public and the
bar. Courts that articulate no reasons for their decisions
undermine that trust by creating the appearance of arbitrari-
ness.
80
Reynolds and Richman later concluded that the "most striking find-
ing of the study is the extremely high cost of nonpublication in terms
of opinion quality" 81 and suggested a Model Rule with a minimum
standard requirement to remedy the problem.
82
In County of Los Angeles v. Kling,83 Justice John Paul Stevens
highlighted the problem inferior unpublished opinions may have on
appellate review. In his dissent, Justice Stevens suggested that the
inadequate Ninth Circuit opinion likely had something to do with the
Supreme Court's own one-sentence summary disposition.84  He
wrote, "[t]he brevity of analysis in the Court of Appeals' unpub-
lished, noncitable opinion.., does not justify the [Supreme] Court's
summary reversal." 85 Stevens expressed concern that the Supreme
Court did not undertake its own review of the district court's findings
of facts, but instead erroneously relied upon an inadequate decision
of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.86 He wrote:
As this Court's summary disposition today demonstrates,
the Court of Appeals would have been well advised to
80. Reynolds & Richman, An Evaluation, supra note 13, at 603.
81. Id. at 628.
82. See id. at 626-27. "Every decision will be accompanied by an opinion
that sufficiently states the facts of the case, its procedural stance and history,
and the relevant legal authority so that the basis for the disposition can be un-
derstood from the opinion and the authority cited." Id.
83. 474 U.S. 936 (1985).
84. See id. at 938 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
85. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
86. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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discuss the record in greater depth. One reason it failed to
do so is that the members of the panel decided that the is-
sues presented by this case did not warrant discussion in a
published opinion that could be "cited to or by the courts of
this circuit, save as provided by Rule 21(c)." That decision
not to publish the opinion or permit it to be cited-like the
decision to promulgate a rule spawning a body of secret
law-was plainly wrong.
8 7
Moreover, for Stevens, a real suspicion is raised when an opinion
lacks a rationale. He noted, "a court of appeals that issues an opinion
that may not be printed or cited.., engages in decisionmaking with-
out the discipline and accountability that the preparation of opinions
requires.
88
4. Lack of uniformity, repetition, and inefficiency
No-citation rules raise the additional problems of lack of uni-
formity, repetition, and inefficiency. The reason is basic: no-citation
rules explicitly limit the precedential value of an opinion and there-
fore limit its ability to be cited. In a hypothetical situation, it is con-
ceivable that on Monday a judge may interpret a statute as creating a
specific right of recovery in an unpublished opinion, while on Tues-
day, another judge in the same court facing identical factual circum-
stances will have an opposite holding because (1) the unpublished
opinion is hidden from view, or (2) the available unpublished opin-
ion is not citable before the court.
This problem is illustrated in National Classification. In that
case, the underlying unpublished decision interpreted a specific
87. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
88. Id. at 940 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Nat'7 Classification Comm.,
765 F.2d at 173 n.2 (stating that unpublished opinions "result in less carefully
prepared or soundly reasoned opinions; reduce judicial accountability; increase
the risk of nonuniformity; allow difficult issues to be swept under the carpet;
and result in a body of 'secret law"'); Reynolds & Richman, An Evahation,
supra note 13, at 608 (discovering no widespread 'hiding' of law-declaring
opinions, but noting that there are some definite "exceptions"). But see Mar-
tineau, supra note 59, at 129 (arguing that the desire of every judge to do the
right thing and the constraints imposed on the appellate court by the appellate
process itself eliminate judicial irresponsibility).
ApIril 2001] 1269
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELESLA WREVIEW
provision of the Motor Carriers Act of 198089 to permit federal
regulation of pork skins and bacon rinds. The first disposition of the
case contained so little analysis that the parties ended up appealing a
second time because neither was sure whether the issues had been
decided. 90 Further, as Circuit Judge Wald wrote, "[b]eing unpub-
lished, No. 83-1866 has no precedential effect. Thus it is highly
likely that another rate bureau will again call upon this court to de-
cide the same statutory questions."
91
It is ironic that the very system designed to streamline the
court's adjudicative process can itself give rise to unnecessary future
litigation. Efficiency goals are undermined where the unpublished
opinion is so deficient that even the litigants question whether the is-
sues were resolved. Efficiency goals are further defeated where an
unpublished opinion is used to dispose of a matter that other parties
are likely to litigate. In spite of guidelines for publication, courts do
dispose of important matters in unpublished opinions. When this
happens, the court and similarly situated parties may find themselves
confronting issues previously disposed of but unavailable because of
the no-citation rules. As Judge Wald explained in National Classifi-
cation, this forced "both the parties and this court [to go] through the
time and expense of a fruitless second appeal. 92
5. Inability to predict precedential value
A fundamental flaw of limited publication is the inability of a
court to predict the future precedential effect of a given case. Ac-
cording to the Standards for Publication, "the decision not to publish
should be made as soon as possible." 93 From an efficiency stand-
point, this makes sense. Otherwise, the expected savings in opinion
preparation time would not be realized.94 This early decision will
determine how thoroughly the opinion is prepared. The problem
arises, however, that at the time the judge is writing, it is not possible
89. 49 U.S.C. § 10706(b)(3)(B) (1994).
90. See Nat ' Classification Comm., 765 F.2d at 174.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION, supra note 23, at 11.
94. See id.
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to predict the precedential value of the opinion.95 The inability to
predict precedential value may arise from a factual question or an
interpretation of the law. It is interesting to note that in order for
limited publication to work, the decision to publish must be made be-
fore writing. Yet, paradoxically, the Standards for Publication also
recognizes that the "reduction of ideas to paper... significantly af-
fects ultimate decisions."96 The danger is that the decision not to
publish will affect the reasoning or even the result.
97
This problem was highlighted by Chief Judge Holloway of the
Tenth Circuit. In his dissent to that court's adoption of stricter no-
citation rules, Judge Holloway observed that in the common-law tra-
dition, "all rulings of this court are precedents."98 Holloway writes:
[W]hen we make our ad hoe determination that a ruling is
not significant enough for publication, we are not in as in-
formed a position as we might believe. Future develop-
ments may well reveal that the ruling is significant indeed.
As we know, we are frequently changing our views on
publication decisions, deciding later to publish them on
motions of the parties or on our own motion. The classifi-
cations are too fine in many instances and we cannot confi-
dently say, in deciding whether to publish, that we are not
working an injustice on parties in later cases.
99
Justice Stevens was even more critical, believing that a judge is sim-
ply never in a position to predict future value. "Judges are the last
persons," he wrote, "who should be authorized to determine which of
their decisions should be long remembered."'100
95. It might be presumed that if the panel that issued the unpublished per
curiam opinion in Christie v. United States, No. 91-2375MN (8th Cir. Mar. 20,
1992), later relied upon by the Anastasoffcourt, realized that it was creating in-
circuit precedent it would have issued a published opinion.
96. STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION, supra note 23, at 2.
97. See Reynolds & Richman, An Evaluation, supra note 13, at 581.
98. Re Rules of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit,
955 F.2d 36, 37 (10th Cir. 1986) (Holloway, C.J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 38 (Holloway, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
100. Reynolds & Richman, Non-Precedential Precedent, supra note 53, at
1192 (quoting Justice John P. Stevens, Remarks at Illinois State Bar Associa-
tion's Centennial Dinner, Springfield, Illinois (Jan. 22, 1977)). Stevens ex-
plained this remark:
[A] rule which authorizes any court to censor the future citation of its
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These problems might manifest themselves when, after oral ar-
gument, a judge or a panel of the court decides that a case does not
warrant a published opinion. The opinion is then written with the
knowledge that the final result will not be published and will not
later be cited as authority. Knowing this to be the end, a brief opin-
ion is written by the judge or judicial staff;10 1 one that lacks a dis-
cernable expression of the court's reasoning. Later it is realized that:
(a) the case was more novel than the court predicted; (b) the opinion
lacked a sufficient rationale; (c) other parties have since litigated the
same issues on identical facts; and (d) those parties did not have the
benefit of the previous opinion because: (1) it was hidden from
view; (2) it could not be cited; or (3) it lacked a sufficient rationale.
III. THE ANASTASOFF 10 2 CASE
On April 13, 1996, Faye Anastasoff, a retired school teacher,
mailed a refund claim to the Internal Revenue Service for federal
taxes she overpaid on April 15, 1993.103 Anastasoff had three years
from the date of the first mailing in which to file her refund claim.
10 4
As it turned out, however, her claim arrived on April 16, 1996-one
day late. The IRS rejected her claim and kept her money."0 5 Anasta-
soff subsequently brought suit against the IRS in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri contending that her
refund was timely under the "mailbox rule."' 0 6 The district court re-
jected her claim and granted summary judgement for the govern-
ment.'0 7 The court reasoned that the mailbox rule could not apply
own opinions or orders rests on a false premise. Such a rule assumes
that an author is a reliable judge of the quality and importance of his
own work product. If I need authority to demonstrate the invalidity of
that assumption, I refer you to a citizen of Illinois who gave a brief
talk in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania that he did not expect to be long re-
membered.
Id.
101. It is acknowledged that judicial clerks most often write unpublished
opinions. See POSNER, supra note 17, at 124; Martin, supra note 40, at 190.
102. Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated as
moot en banc, No. 99-3917, 2000 WL 183092 (8th Cir. Dec. 18, 2000).
103. See id. at 899.
104. See26U.S.C. § 6511(b) (1994).
105. See Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 899.
106. See id. at 898.
107. See id. at 899.
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under these circumstances because Anastasoff's original tax claim
filed on April 15, 1993 was itself timely. 0 8 The court held that the
mailbox rule "could not apply to any part of a timely claim."'1 9 In
other words, because Anastasoff filed her 1993 income taxes on
time, the mailbox rule could not save her claim for a refund mailed
within the three-year limitation, but received one day late.
On appeal to the Eighth Circuit, Anastasoff argued that as a
matter of policy, the mailbox rule should apply "whenever neces-
sary" to fulfill its remedial purpose and save taxpayers from the "va-
garies of the postal system."'1 0 If applied, the mailbox rule would
preserve her refund claim as timely as if received when mailed."'
Writing for a unanimous three-judge panel, Circuit Judge Richard S.
Arnold affirmed the district court ruling.12 In so doing, the Eighth
Circuit issued a precedent-setting opinion that was the "talk of the
appellate world within hours,"" 3 and which inspired renewed calls
for court reform. 
14
Judge Arnold explained that the court had no choice but to af-
firm the district court and reject Anastasoffs claim because eight
years before, on similar facts, the court "rejected precisely the same
legal argument."" 5 In that earlier decision, Christie v. United
States,116 the court considered a refund claim that was mailed just
prior to the three-year bar but was received just after the deadline"17
Like Anastasoff, the taxpayer in that case argued that the mailbox
rule should operate regardless of the claim's timeliness."' Although
the Christie opinion was unpublished and mere persuasive
108. See id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See 26 U.S.C. § 7502 (1994).
112. See Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 899.
113. Mauro, supra note 35.
114. See All Opinions Are Precedential, N.J. L.J., Sept. 4, 2000, available at
LEXIS, News Library, N.J. L.J. File (using Arnold's opinion to call for the ap-
pointment of more New Jersey state court judges and the reform of the local
judicial selection process).
115. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 899.
116. No. 91-2375MN (8th Cir. Mar. 20, 1992).
117. See Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 899.
118. See id.
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authority under the court's own rules, the panel felt it was nonethe-
less bound to it as authoritative in-circuit precedent."
9
Anastasoff s attorney did not attempt to distinguish the Christie
case and Judge Arnold pointed out that Anastasoff's reasoning was
"squarely inconsistent with the effect [she] desires to attribute to the
regulation." 120 At oral argument, Arnold pointedly asked Anasta-
soff's attorney: "What do you make of the Christie opinion?"' 121 in
response, her attorney matter-of-factly replied that because the deci-
sion was unpublished it was "not binding on this court."'12 2 Taking
issue, Arnold said: "This is where I disagree with you. I think it is
unconstitutional for a court to say we decided a case a certain way
yesterday, but we don't like it anymore and we're ignoring it. It flies
in the face of the whole notion of a court.',
12 3
On August 22, 2000, Judge Arnold issued a decision for the
court declaring Rule 28A(i) 124 unconstitutional.1 2 5 The Rule, "inso-
far as it would allow us to avoid the precedential effect of our prior
decisions," he wrote, "purports to expand the judicial power beyond
the bounds of Article III .... That rule does not, therefore, free us
from our duty to follow this Court's decision in Christie."'
26
Faye Anastasoff did not anticipate the ruling. Her attorneys
went to the Eighth Circuit prepared to argue the merits of the mail-
box rule and the fine points of the relevant IRS regulations-a
seemingly routine case. Of the ruling, her attorney later said "[it]
119. See id.
120. Id.
121. Oral argument for the Anastasoff case (No. 99-3917) can be heard
through the Eighth Circuit's website, United States Court of Appeals, Oral Ar-
guments, at http://8cc-www.ca8.uscourts.gov/Oral-Arg/scripts/GetRA.asp.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. It provides:
Unpublished opinions are not precedent and parties generally should
not cite them. When relevant to establishing the doctrines of res judi-
cata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case, however, the parties
may cite any unpublished opinion. Parties may also cite an unpub-
lished opinion of this court if the opinion has persuasive value on a
material issue and no published opinion of this or another court would
serve as well.
8TH CIR. R. 28A(i).
125. SeeAnastasoff, 223 F.3d at 905.
126. Id. at 900.
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certainly was a surprise" especially since the constitutionality of the
rule was "not raised in either brief by either side."'
127
In declaring the Eighth Circuit's no-citation rule unconstitu-
tional, Judge Arnold cited no precedent of his own. 128 Rather, his
opinion rested upon two interrelated arguments. First, Arnold made
an historical argument about the establishment and adoption of the
doctrine of precedent by the Framers of the Constitution. Second, he
suggested that the nature of this doctrine incorporated into the Con-
stitution was more strict than is our contemporary understanding of
the doctrine of precedent.
Anastasoff subsequently filed a petition for rehearing en banc,
asserting that the panel's constitutional holding was in error, and
that, on the merits, the Eighth Circuit should abandon Christie.
29
While still pending review, the government took two important ac-
tions that mooted Anastasoff's claim. First, the IRS reversed course
with its arguments and formally announced that the mailbox rule
would apply to claims such as Anastasoffs.130 Second, the govern-
ment paid Faye Anastasoff her refund claim in full, with interest.1
3 1
In light of these actions, the Eighth Circuit, sitting en banc, vacated
its earlier decision as moot and remanded the case back to the district
court.13 2 Under the pen of Judge Arnold, however, the court did not
foreclose on its earlier rationale. Explaining that the court sits "to
decide cases, not issues," Arnold wrote that "whether unpublished
opinions have precedential effect no longer has any relevance for the
decision of this tax-refund case."'133 The constitutionality of the no-
citation rule, however, "remains an open question."'
34
127. Mauro, supra note 35 (quoting Anastasoff's attorney Juan Keller).
128. See France, supra note 9, at 2228; see also Steve France, Right to Cite,
A.B.A. J., Oct. 2000, at 24 (stating that in establishing a new right to cite un-
published opinions, Judge Arnold did not cite any cases on the subject).
129. See Anastasoff v. United States, No. 99-3917, 2000 WL 1863092 (8th
Cir. Dec. 18, 2000) (en bane).
130. See Weisbart v. United States, 2000 WL 1711554 (Nov. 13, 2000); see
also IRSAgrees that Refund Claim on Late Return Can be Timely Under Mail-
box Rule, 46 FED. TAXES WKLY. ALERT 581, 583 (2000) (describing the IRS
changes regarding the timeliness of refund claims under the mailbox rule).
131. See Anastasoff, 2000 WL 1863092, at *1.
132. See id. at *2.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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IV. A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE DOCTRINE OF PRECEDENT
A. American Legal Tradition and the Constitution
The doctrine of precedent dates at least as far back as the old
English year-books. 135 Bolstering an argument with examples of a
similar case is a logical short-hand technique for lawyers. This habit
of reasoning by example, it is said, is more or less a compulsive habit
of common lawyers.1
36
Yet, the extent to which the Framers incorporated the notion of
binding precedent into the Constitution is unsettled. For the framing
of the Constitution fell squarely in the middle of a historical shift: a
movement away from the prevailing English common law toward the
formation of a particularly American legal tradition. The weight one
accords to these two traditions, what the Framers might have previ-
ously known in the English colonies, and what emerged immediately
following independence and the drafting of the Constitution, may
determine how the historic roots of the doctrine of precedent are
judged. By analogy, in contractual disputes, the conduct of the par-
ties is often held as some indication of what their intentions might
have been at the moment of contract formation. Historically, the Su-
preme Court has looked beyond contemporaneous statements to the
establishment of trends or absence thereof when evaluating the
Framers' intent.' 37 Assessing the Framers' intent in this situation is
especially difficult given the unsettled state of American law at the
time.
135. See J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 171
(2d ed. 1979) ("By the 1280s the very words of the judges and pleaders were
being taken down in the year-books, and by the fourteenth century we find
these books being cited as evidence of law and practice."); see also E.M. Wise,
The Doctrine of Stare Decisis, 21 WAYNE L. REV. 1043, 1047 (1975) (stating
that "[t]he habit of looking to what was decided before for guidance, of rea-
soning by analogy, by example, is found of course in English law in the middle
ages").
136. See Wise, supra note 135, at 1047.
137. Cf Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 175 (1926) ("This Court has
repeatedly laid down the principle that a contemporaneous legislative exposi-
tion of the Constitution when the founders of our Government and framers of
our Constitution were actively participating in public affairs, acquiesced in for
a long term of years, fixes the construction to be given its provisions.").
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Despite the Constitution's silence, 138 Judge Arnold suggests that
the doctrine of precedent was implicitly adopted by the Framers of
the Constitution. A majority of the Framers, he points out, were
lawyers familiar with the doctrine of precedent by the time they
gathered in Philadelphia.1 39 The implication is that the Framers were
not only familiar with the doctrine of precedent, but they embraced it
as the appropriate method of adjudication in the new United States.
The doctrine was not merely "well-established," Arnold suggests, it
was the "historic method of judicial decision-making" and consid-
ered a "bulwark of judicial independence."' 40 Arnold supports his
straightforward argument by looking at the influential writings of Sir
William Blackstone and Sir Edward Coke.
1. Early influences on the doctrine of precedent
Sir William Blackstone's popularity arose at a time when there
was but one small American law school and lawyers were starved for
books.14 1 For example, John Adams complained that in 1758, before
the publication of Blackstone's Commentaries, the American study
of law was "a dreary ramble."'142 Blackstone's famous Commentar-
ies was the single most authoritative source reporting English
cases. 143 In fact, Blackstone was considerably more popular in the
United States than in his native England. According to an early
twentieth-century Supreme Court opinion, cited by Judge Arnold,
"[a]t the time of the adoption of the Federal Constitution,... [Black-
stone's work] had been published about twenty years, and it has been
said that more copies of the work had been sold in this country than
138. See U.S. CONST. art. HI, § 1, cl. 1 ("The judicial Power of the United
States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.").
139. See Anastasoffv. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 900 n.4. (8th Cir. 2000),
vacated as moot en banc, No. 99-3917, 2000 WL 183092 (8th Cir. Dec. 18,
2000).
140. Id. at 900.
141. See ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN
SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 34 (1955); see also Perry Miller, Introduction to
THE LEGAL MIND IN AMERICA, supra note 12, at 17 (declaring that the Ameri-
can legal profession was in a "sorry state" when the Constitution was adopted).
142. Miller, supra note 141, at 15.
143. See id. at 19 (describing Blackstone's Commentaries as the bible for the
American legal profession, but limited to the laws of England).
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in England; so that undoubtedly, the Framers of the Constitution
were familiar with it."
144
Given Blackstone's "great influence on the Framers' under-
standing of law,"' 145 Arnold suggests that when Blackstone wrote "it
is an established rule to abide by former precedents,"' 146 the Framers
collectively adopted his word as their own. Arnold provides evi-
dence of this through the words of Alexander Hamilton. For exam-
ple, Hamilton wrote in The Federalist No. 78 that "[t]o avoid an ar-
bitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that they should be
bound down by strict rules and precedents, which serve to define and
point out their duty in every particular case that comes before
them."'147 Arnold observes that both Hamilton and James Madison
endorsed the idea that the accumulation of precedents would be
beneficial. For example, Madison is quoted as saying "[a]mong
other difficulties, the exposition of the Constitution is frequently a
copious source, and must continue so until its meaning on all great
points shall have been settled by precedents."'
148
The other great influence cited by Arnold is Sir Edward Coke,
who "more than any other person ... established the authority of
rules on the basis that they had been previously enunciated by courts
of common law."'149 Coke was something of a hero to American pa-
triots for he had led a successful struggle against the arbitrary usur-
pations by the English monarchy through the strength and authority
of those precedents.'5 0 American patriots identified his struggle with
their own against the English Crown and frequently turned to Coke
for authority.' 51
144. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 901 n.8 (citation omitted).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 900 (quoting SIR WILLIAM W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES OF
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 69 (1765)).
147. THE FEDERALISTNO. 78, supra note 2, at 662.
148. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 902 (quoting James Madison, Letter from James
Madison to Samuel Johnson (June 21, 1789), in 12 PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON 250 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1977)).
149. Harold J. Berman & Charles J. Reid, Jr., The Transformation of English
Legal Science: From Hale to Blackstone, 45 EMORY L.J. 438,446-47 (1996).
150. See Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 900 n.6.
151. See id. (quoting Sir Edward Coke as stating that "precedents have al-
ways been respected").
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Further, in The Transformation of American Law, cited by
Arnold, 152 Morton Horwitz states that "the overwhelming fact about
American law through most of the eighteenth century is the extent to
which lawyers believed that English authority settled virtually all
questions for which there was no legislative rule."' 5' Relying on
these authorities, Arnold concludes that the doctrine of precedent
"was not merely well-established; it was the historic method of judi-
cial decision-making, and regarded as a bulwark of judicial inde-
pendence in past struggles for liberty."'
154
2. The uncertain establishment of the doctrine of precedent
As a young nation founded on independence from England, the
historical context of the Constitution suggests that the nature of the
doctrine of precedent would be unclear. As former Supreme Court
Justice Jackson pointed out, in the early days, the Supreme Court
"had no tradition of its own.'15 The Court, he analogized, was like a
ship without a rudder, for "[t]he Constitution... launched a Court
without a jurisprudence."'156 Furthermore, the precedents which did
exist at the time came from the common law, the state courts, or
from England. Contrary to common assumptions, adherence to the
common law was not "inevitable and unopposed., 15 7 In the after-
math of the Revolution, British law was so unpopular that some
states prohibited lawyers from citing British precedents.1
58
152. See id. at 900.
153. MORTON HoRWrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-
1860, at 8 (1992).
154. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 900.
155. JACKSON, supra note 141, at 29.
156. Id.; see also Perry Miller, Introduction to Nathaniel Chipman, Sketches
on the Principle of Government, in THE LEGAL MIND IN AMERICA, supra note
12, at 19 (describing America as a "tabula rasa," compelled to start anew).
157. JACKSON, supra note 141, at 29.
158. See id.; see also ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED, ANTISLAVERY
AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 140-41 (1975). Cover explained the nature of the
tension between the English common law tradition and the search for an
American tradition: "In early nineteenth-century America, without reference
to the British corpus, the richness of experience desirable for common law ju-
risprudence would be lacking. But resort to the English decisions meant po-
tential adoption of rules and principles from highly suspect Englishmen and an
admission of national inadequacy." COVER, supra, at 140-41.
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Even the revered Sir William Blackstone was called into ques-
tion. As early as 1793, Judge Nathaniel Chipman 159 directly criti-
cized Blackstone and his position of influence in America. In a na-
tionalist tone, Chipman suggested that American law ought to be
distinct and removed from any association with England. Specifi-
cally, American law should "be able both in theory and in practice to
exclude all foreign principles."'160 As such, Blackstone, a "British
subject, highly in favor with the government" had no place in the
learnings of a democratic republic. 161 "Unhappily," Chipman la-
mented, "[Blackstone's] Commentaries are the only treatise of law,
to which the law students, in these states, have access."' 162 St.
George Tucker, one of America's foremost legal educators at the
time, seized upon the same problem. 163 In 1803, Tucker sought to
limit the influence of Blackstone on the emerging American legal
community by publishing his own Americanized version of the
Commentaries.
164
A "retreat from adherence to the doctrine of precedent" coin-
cides with the critical years surrounding the Constitution. 165  In
Transformation of American Law, Morton Horwitz observes that one
of the "most universal features of postrevolutionary American juris-
prudence was an attack on the colonial subservience to precedent."'
166
Nathaniel Chipman is again heard to complain that the legal profes-
sion had followed precedents "with too great veneration."' 67 These
precedents, he said, "were made at a time when the state of society,
and of property were very different from what they are at present."1
68
159. See Miller, supra note 156, at 19 (referring to the Vermont judge as a
leader of the bar).
160. Nathaniel Chipman, Sketches of the Principles of Government, in THE
LEGAL MIND IN AMERICA, supra note 12, at 29.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. See CRAIG EVAN KLAFTER, REASON OVER PRECEDENTS: ORIGINS OF
AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 2 (1993).
164. See id. Tucker successfully separated American legal thought from
Blackstone and the English legal system. Specifically, Tucker introduced
relativism to establish that "reason should be the law's ultimate test." Id.
165. HORWiTz, supra note 153, at 24.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
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To follow existing precedent, Chipman argued, would be akin to
following "arbitrary rules" or "arbitrary decisions" without under-
standing that they "arose out of [a different] state of society.' 169 And
this he said would be "certainly contrary to the principles of our gov-
ernment and the spirit of our laws." 170 This retreat from precedent
"went hand in hand with a new definition of the role of the judge in
formulating legal rules."
171
The tension between the availability of English precedent and
the proud search for an American tradition 172 was clearly evident in
1798, when Jesse Root compiled the first systematic case reporter for
the state of Connecticut. In the preface to his Reports, Root de-
scribed the sources of American common law, and like Chipman, he
urged independence from the inapplicable English laws.17  Root
wrote:
[American common law] is essentially different from all, in
that it is highly improved and ameliorated in its principles
and regulations, and simplified in its forms, is adapted to
the state of our country, and to the genius of the people, and
calculated in an eminent manner to improve the mind by the
diffusion of knowledge, and to give effectual security and
protection to the person, rights, liberties and properties of
the citizens, and is clothed with an energy, derived from a
source, and rendered efficacious by a power, unknown in
foreign governments, (viz.) the attachment of the citizens
who rejoice in being ruled and governed by its laws, for the
blessings it confers. Let us, Americans then, duly appreci-
ate our own government, laws and manners, and be
169. Id. at 25.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 27.
172. See COVER, supra note 158, and accompanying text.
173. The superiority of American legal thought expressed by Chipman,
Root, and later William Sampson can be traced to a tension existing during the
revolutionary period. For example, Bernard Bailyn has observed that "English
law-as authority, as legitimizing precedent, as embodied principle, and as the
framework of historical understanding-stood side by side with Enlightenment
rationalism in the minds of the Revolutionary generation." BERNARD BAILYN,
THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 31 (1967).
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what we profess-an independent nation-and not plume
ourselves upon being humble imitators of foreigners .... 174
Root is also one of the earliest voices heard to call for the "codi-
fication" of the laws which would later gain prominence in the
1820s. 75 Root wrote that the unwritten customs and regulations of
England, which comprised the common law, have no place in
American law. Rather, he argued that in a free and orderly govern-
ment such as America, our "statutes are positive laws enacted by the
authority of the legislature, which consists of the representatives of
the people, being duly promulgated, are binding upon all, as all are
considered as consenting to them ... "176
The push for codification was also a direct attack on the legis-
lating role judges were seen to play. 177 According to the historian
Robert Cover, the codifiers "stressed that common law jurisprudence
put the future of the law at the mercy of the caprice, whim, class and
party passion of the men who sit on the bench.' ' 7 8 Cover noted that
the common law was not without its defenders. Yet even they were
174. Root, supra note 12, at 38.
175. William Sampson is recognized as the most vigorous booster of "codi-
fication." In a speech delivered before the New York Historical Society in
1823, Sampson attacked the long oral tradition of the common law arguing that
Americans should no longer "believe that we can be governed, at this day, by
the oral traditions of semi-savage Saxons who could have no knowledge nor
conception of the objects with which our law is conversant." William Samp-
son, An Anniversary Discourse, in THE LEGAL MIND IN AMERICA, supra note
12, at 126. Sampson reported that codification "has been the first glory of the
greatest sovereigns and the best policy of the wisest people." Id. at 131; see
also COVER, supra note 158, at 141 (observing that Sampson was even more
concerned that the common law meant dependence on the past); ARTHUR M.
SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF JACKSON 330 (1945) (observing that dissatis-
faction with the state of the common law bred the movement toward codifica-
tion); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: 1776-
1789, at 301-03 (1968) (tracing the origins of codification to before 1780).
176. Root, supra note 12, at 37.
177. See WOOD, supra note 175, at 298-305.
178. COVER, supra note 158, at 141-42. Cover quotes Robert Rantoul: "It is
because judge-made law is indefinitely and vaguely settled.., that it possesses
the capacity of adapting itself to new cases, or, in other words, admits of judi-
cial legislation." Id. at 142. William Sampson also extolled the virtues of
codification, for "[tihe law will govern the decision of judges, and not the deci-
sions the law [sic]." Sampson, supra note 175, at 132.
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heard to condemn "slavish adherence to precedent."' 179 For example,
while Francis Lieber expressed a belief that some adherence to
precedent was necessary, he also wrote: "If we should consider all
future cases of a similar nature as prejudged by our [past] decision,
stagnation would be the consequence, instead of an expansion and
development of the law."180 Cover noted that "the rejection of the
ultimate authority of precedent was necessary if the defenders of the
common law" were to hold off the attacks of the codifiers.
18 1
It is suggested here, that in evaluating what the Framers knew
and accepted of the doctrine of precedent, it is necessary to recognize
that the Constitution arose during a time of legal ferment. The Con-
stitution was born during a "confused and confusing complex of
emotions, traditions, and aspirations."'182 Placed in the context of an
emerging American legal tradition, the contemporaneous statements
of Hamilton and Madison cited by Arnold are of limited persuasive
force. For Alexander Hamilton also recognized the emergence of an
American form of law employing reason and equity in order to jus-
tify deviation from English precedent.'8 3 "[T]hough the reporters of
adjudged cases have been read and attended to in our courts," Ham-
ilton wrote, "where the injustice of them could be pointed out they
were rejected."1
8 4
If binding precedent was as ingrained as Arnold suggests, one
should expect to find contemporaneous and weighty evidence of it
beyond a few statements of Hamilton and Madison.1SS Rather, what
179. COVER, supra note 158, at 142.
180. Id. at 143.
181. Id.
182. Perry Miller, Introduction to THE LEGAL MIND IN AMERICA, supra note
12, at 17-18.
183. See WOOD, supra note 175, at 299.
184. Id. Hamilton also wrote "All Lawyers agree that the spirit and reason
of a law, is one of the principal rule of interpretation." Id. at 299 n.67. And to
William Livingston, it was "a monstrous Absurdity to suppose, that the Law is
to be learnt by a perpetual copying of Precedents [for] Time immemorial can
never give a Sanctum to what is against Reason and common Sense." Id.
185. Cf Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 916, 918 (1996) (observing
that the absence of congressional acts being forced on the states by the federal
government provides evidence that the federal government did not conceive of
such a role for itself until only recently); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 723-
24 (1986) (stating that the arguments of James Madison before the First Con-
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is consistently seen is a struggle over the role of precedent in the
young nation. Under these circumstances, the country's first genera-
tion of lawyers were instilled with a "dynamic conception of law,
constantly improving as it was encouraged to adapt to the needs of a
changing society."' 186 As Justice Jackson observed:
The Supreme Court was not bound to any particular body of
learning for guidance. When the Court moved to Wash-
ington in 1800, it was provided with no books, which
probably accounts for the high quality of early opinions. In
five of Marshall's great opinions he cited not a single
precedent. The leading commentators, Kent and Story, fre-
quently cited civil law authorities, chiefly from Dutch or
French sources.' 
87
Ascribing concrete legal thoughts to the Framers under these condi-
tions is simply overstating the case.'
88
B. The Nature of the Doctrine of Precedent and Stare Decisis
Up to this point, the doctrine of precedent has been referred to
only in general terms. This needs clarification. Karl Llewellyn has
written that precedent is one of our most misunderstood legal con-
ceptions. 189 In The Common Law Tradition, Llewellyn writes that
our "false conception" of precedent has led us to believe that prece-
dent is a system of dictation control. 190 Rather, our precedent system
is one of guidance and suggestion and only rarely a system of
gress provided "contemporaneous and weighty evidence" of the Constitution's
meaning because they were adopted by Members of the First Congress who
were also Framers of the Constitution).
186. KLAFTER, supra note 163, at 2.
187. JACKSON, supra note 141, at 30 (emphasis added).
188. E.g., Monaghan, supra note 3, at 770 n.267. Monaghan stated:
The Framers were familiar with the idea of precedent. But there is no
historical basis for asserting that they intended to accord a privileged
position to precedent over text. The whole idea of just what precedent
entailed was unclear. The relative uncertainty over precedent in 1789
also reflects the fact that "many state couiis were manned by laymen,
and state law and procedure were frequently in unsettled condition.
The colonial and state courts did not enjoy high prestige, and their
opinions were not even deemed worthy of publication."
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting JACKSON, supra note 141, at 33).
189. See LLEWELLYN, supra note 1, at 62.
190. Id. at 62-63.
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dictation.' 91 To demonstrate the flexibility of our precedent system,
Llewellyn described sixty-four ways in which precedents can be dis-
tinguished. 192
In the Anastasoff case, Judge Arnold contends that the princi-
ples, which form the doctrine of precedent and which give rise to a
duty to follow precedent where it exists, were "well established and
well regarded at the time this nation was founded."' 193 These princi-
ples included the notion that an opinion is a declaration of law which
must be followed in subsequent cases. "Inherent in every judicial
decision," Arnold wrote, "is a declaration and interpretation of a
general principle or rule of law."' 94 This declaration "must be ap-
plied in subsequent cases to similarly situated parties."' 95  To the
extent that the Eighth Circuit's no-citation rule would allow the court
to avoid the precedential effect of the unpublished opinion on point,
it would "expand the judicial power beyond the bounds of Article III,
and is therefore unconstitutional."'
196
Judge Arnold observes that the contemporary understanding of
precedent is different from that of the Founders. "Modem legal
scholars," he writes, "tend to justify the authority of precedents on
equitable or prudential grounds."'197 By contrast, Arnold suggests
that the doctrine of precedent which the Framers understood was
much more strict.
191. See id. at75.
192. See id. at 77-91.
193. Anastasoffv. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 900 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated
as moot en banc, No. 99-3917, 2000 WL 183092 (8th Cir. Dec. 18, 2000).
194. Id. at 899 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (3 Cranch) 137, 177-78
(1803)).
195. Id. at 900 (citing Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821),
and James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 544 (1991)).
196. Id.
197. Id. at 901 n.7 (citing Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REv.
571, 595-602 (1987)); see also Berman & Reid, supra note 149, at 447 (stating
that the "modem" doctrine of precedent holds that "judicial decisions are an
authoritative source of law, binding on courts in later analogous cases [which]
requires a sharp distinction between statements made by judges that are neces-
sary to their decisions and those that are not necessary"). This requirement in
the "modem" form recognizes a distinction between dicta and the holding of
the case. See Berman & Reid, supra note 149, at 447. It being the holding of
the cases that constitutes binding rules of law, whereas the "traditionary" form
recognized the importance of judicial custom. See id. at 449.
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Using the words of Sir William Blackstone and Sir Edward
Coke, Arnold's argument progresses as follows: First, the eight-
eenth-century view of precedent derives from the nature of judicial
power itself.198 The nature of this power required that judges "de-
termine the law."' 99 In order to determine the existing law, judges
not only chose the appropriate legal principle, but expounded and
interpreted it.20 0 Second, the nature of judicial power is only to de-
termine what the law is, not to invent it.20 ' Third, because prece-
dents are the best evidence of what the law is, the judicial power is
limited by them. 20 2  Finally, the law-declaring nature of judicial
power applies to a single existing decision. Thus, a single decision
can create binding precedent.
20 3
Arnold's argument finds some support in the writing of Morton
Horwitz. In The Transformation of American Law, Horwitz de-
scribes a "strict conception of precedent" which he says is derived
from "the very conception of the nature of common law principles as
preexisting standards discoverable by judges.' 20 4 To ignore existing
precedent would be to cross the line separating law and legislation.
20 5
Arnold's reasoning, however, is open to strong criticism. 2 6 The
eighteenth century form of precedent has sometimes been called the
"traditionary" doctrine of precedent.2 0 7 This form was closely re-
lated to the concept of judicial custom.20 8 Within this framework it
was a series of cases that provided the source of the law. A case was
198. See Anastasoff 223 F.3d at 901.
199. Id.
200. See id.
201. See id.
202. See id.
203. See id. (quoting Sir Edward Coke as stating that "a judicial decision is
to the same extent a declaration of the law").
204. HORWITZ, supra note 153, at 8-9.
205. See id. at 9.
206. See France, supra note 9, at 2229 (quoting Michael Paulsen: "The idea
that the Constitution requires that cases be considered binding on the judiciary
is really so extreme as to border on the frivolous. Stare decisis has never been
understood to be a binding rule that the judiciary can't re-examine the holding
of a previous case.").
207. See Berman & Reid, supra note 149, at 449.
208. See id. at 449.
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not the law itself, but mere evidence of it.20 9 In Precedent and Stare
Decisis: The Critical Years, 1800 to 1850, Frederick Kempin sug-
gests that evidence from the colonial period is "scanty" but tends to
show that the colonists "believed the law to be something above and
superior to cases." 210 Under such a theory, Kempin notes it would be
difficult to "convince a judge of the immutability of prior deci-
sions." 211 The notion that there is a transcendental body of law
above and beyond the law of any state was embodied in the 1842 de-
cision in Swift v. Tyson.
212
The doctrine of precedent is also distinguishable from the doc-
trine of stare decisis.213 According to Kempin, stare decisis "may
use a single precedent (which is not necessarily the accumulated ex-
perience of the courts) as 'binding,' or persuasive, authority."
214
This is particularly useful here because Judge Arnold's application of
the doctrine of precedent more closely resembles the doctrine of stare
decisis than anything else. The central question Judge Arnold poses
is whether a court is constitutionally bound to follow a single prece-
dent issued by an equal or higher court. He suggests that a court is
bound to follow precedent because failure to do so would amount to
an abuse ofjudicial power akin to legislation. Assuming the Framers
were influenced by more than just Blackstone's Commentaries, the
nature of stare decisis should be examined.
209. See Frederick G. Kempin, Jr., Precedent and Stare Decisis: The Critical
Years, 1800 to 1850, 3 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 28, 31 (1959).
210. Id. at 33.
211. Id. at33-34.
212. 41 U.S. (15 Pet.) 1 (1842).
213. See Roscoe Pound, What of Stare Decisis?, 10 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 5-6
(1941). Pound defined stare decisis:
[A] common-law technique [of decision] based on a conception of law
as experience developed by reason and reason tested and developed by
experience. It is a technique of finding the grounds of decision in re-
corded judicial experience, making for stability by requiring adher-
ence to decisions of the same question in the past, allowing growth
and change by the freedom of choice from among competing analo-
gies of equal authority when new questions arise or old ones take on
new forms.
Id.
214. Kempin, supra note 209, at 30.
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Frederick Kempin suggests that without a firm doctrine of stare
decisis "courts could search for the 'true' law without regard to any
binding authority in prior cases" because cases were "but evidence of
the law.' 215 Kempin highlights various cases which demonstrate that
a firm doctrine of stare decisis really did not emerge in the United
States until after 1800.2 16 The emergence of this doctrine had a lot to
do with the fact that there was no reliable system of reporters from
which attorneys and judges could cite until the early nineteenth cen-
tury.217 Without printed records of judicial opinions precedent would
be difficult to adhere to, or alternately, easy to ignore.218 Under
these circumstances, it might be said that the doctrine of precedent as
contained in a series of cases evidencing the law could readily be
conceived as creating binding authority, but a single case need not do
the same, unless the principle of law contained therein is correct. As
Lord Mansfield said in 1762, "[t]he reason and spirit of cases make
law; not the letter of particular precedents., 219 And it has further
been said that among the American revolutionary generation "[t]he
law was no science of what to do next."
220
215. Id. at 33; see also COVER, supra note 158, at 142 (explaining the dis-
tinction that precedent did not itself constitute the common law, but was mere
evidence of it was important because it "justified selectivity in the holding to
the past").
216. See Kempin, supra note 209, at 37-46.
217. See id. at 34; see also Wise, supra note 135, at 1049 (observing that the
doctrine of precedent did not crystallize until systematic reports emerged).
Arnold suggests, however, that the "Framers did not regard this absence of a
reporting system as an impediment to the precedential authority of a judicial
decision." Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 903. It might be observed, however, that
the reason these earliest "unpublished decisions" may have been so "recog-
nized" is because they were a part of a well-known line of cases representing
existing judicial customs.
218. Peter Tiersma has noted that the historical transition from oral legal tra-
ditions to writing and printing played a direct and important role in the devel-
opment of precedent. For even if judges and lawyers could remember a prior
court decision, they could conveniently "forget" it at will. Written opinions
contain a more accurate recording of the court's order and thus an authority
from which it is difficult to deviate. See PETER M. TIERSMA, LEGAL
LANGUAGE 40 (1999).
219. Berman & Reid, supra note 149, at 449.
220. BAILYN, supra note 173, at 31.
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While Sir Edward Coke may have been one of the most influen-
tial legal writers on precedent, 221 his application of it accords with
the flexible nature of precedent described by Karl Llewellyn.
"[J]udicial precedents," Sir Edward Coke wrote, "and the right en-
tries of pleas upon this (or any other) statutes are good interpreters of
the same; and of questions that have been, or may be moved there-
upon." 222 Noticeably absent is any sense that precedents must be
followed. Rather, Coke may not be saying much more than that
precedents provide useful guidance for uncovering the existing
law.223 Furthermore, Coke was known to have compiled and even
distorted cases as "examples" that supported his views.2
4
If there is a majority opinion among commentators, it is simply
that no frm doctrine of either precedent or stare decisis existed dur-
ing the critical years surrounding the framing of the Constitution.
3
On this basis, Judge Arnold's conclusion again seems overstated:
[I]n the late eighteenth century, the doctrine of precedent
was well-established in legal practice (despite the absence
of a reporting system), regarded as an immemorial custom,
and valued for its role in past struggles for liberty. The
duty of courts to follow their prior decisions was under-
stood to derive from the nature of the judicial power itself
and to separate it from a dangerous union with the legisla-
tive power . . . . We conclude therefore that, as the
221. See Berman & Reid, supra note 149, and accompanying text.
222. SIR EDWARD COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE
LAws OF ENGLAND 25 (1797), quoted in H. Jefferson Powell, The Modern
Misunderstanding of Original Intent, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1513, 1535 n.85
(1987) (emphasis added).
223. See Wise, supra note 135, at 1047 (noting that "Coke... never says
that precedents are controlling").
224. See Berman & Reid, supra note 149, at 447.
225. See, e.g., Pound, supra note 213, at 6 ("Just how binding is 'binding
authority' in our common-law technique? A single decision has never been
regarded as absolutely binding at all events .... Perhaps it is just as well that
the exact limits of this term 'binding authority' have never been rigidly de-
fined."); see also LLEWELLYN, supra note 1, at 75 (suggesting that our system
of precedent has long been a "system of guidance and suggestion and pressure,
and only on occasion a system of dictation-'control"').
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Framers intended, the doctrine of precedent limits the "ju-
dicial power" delegated to the courts in Article 111.226
Judge Arnold's argument that failure to heed a precedent is akin
to inventing new legislation is misplaced. If a case is mere evidence
of the law, it should follow that what judges are prevented from do-
ing is "inventing" new principles of law. Theoretically, this should
be impossible because those principles were thought to be transcen-
dental principles that would only be discoverable, not subject to
creation. If this is correct, judges during the colonial era could not
truly invent law as Judge Arnold suggests. Furthermore, it has been
seen that as the law in this country was being Americanized, equity
and reason were used to reject existing precedent.
2 27
C. Anastasoff and Unpublished Opinions
In the Anastasoff case, Judge Richard Arnold writes that he is
not deciding "whether opinions should be published., 228 The ques-
tion he says he is faced with is "whether they ought to have prece-
dential effect, whether published or not., 229 Calling the no-citation
rule unconstitutional, however, is effectively pulling the rug out from
under the system all together. As Chief Judge Boyce F. Martin of
the Sixth Circuit has written, the crux of unpublished opinions is the
no-citation rule itself. "[I]f a no-citation rule did not go hand in hand
with a no publication rule," he wrote, "I would feel that we should do
away with the no-publication rule and go back to the old full publi-
cation rule, and that is because of the question of stare decisis."
230
As illustrated by Christie231 and embodied in Anastasoff a central
problem with limited publication is the inability of any court issuing
an unpublished opinion to be able to predict precedential value.
Opinions are said to cast a shadow into the future.23 2 How far or
226. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 903.
227. See supra notes 180-81 and accompanying text.
228. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 904.
229. Id.
230. Martin, supra note 40, at 196.
231. Christie v. United States, No. 91-2375MN (8th Cir. Mar. 20, 1992).
232. See LLEWELLYN, supra note 1, at 26. Llewellyn writes:
In our law the opinion has in addition a central forward-looking func-
tion which reaches far beyond the cause in hand: the opinion has as
one if not its major office to show how like cases are properly to be
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how wide that shadow falls is subject to change. It is simply impos-
sible for a court to anticipate the value that any given opinion will
have in the years to come.
To hold the no-citation rule unconstitutional insofar as it allows
the court to avoid the precedential effect of the unpublished decision
and yet still claim to uphold limited publication is problematic.
Courts would be told to follow the precedent of an unpublished deci-
sion if and when one is found. The problem with this is that attor-
neys will have the incentive to find an unpublished opinion where
they previously did not. As already noted, unpublished opinions are
often inferior in substantive quality to published ones.233 Therefore,
the real possibility exists that courts may find themselves straining to
adjudicate a case based on an inadequate unpublished opinion.
This raises the additional problem of locating a precedential un-
published opinion. Judge Arnold claims that there is no secret law
because all unpublished opinions are available in some form or an-
other.234 The practical problem raised here is that there is no uniform
system for discovering the existence of these unpublished opinions.
For example, in Anastasoff, the government kept a copy of the un-
published Christie case in its files as an opinion favorable to its posi-
tion. By virtue of its frequent litigation, the government has the
unique ability to create files of favorable unpublished opinions that
remain unknown to private litigants.
235
decided in the future. This also frequently casts its shadow before,
and affects the deciding of the cause in hand. (If I cannot give a rea-
son I should be willing to stand to, I must shrink from the very result
which otherwise seems good.) Thus the opinion serves as a steadying
factor which aids reckonability. Its preparation affords not only back-
check and cross-check on any contemplated decision by way of conti-
nuity with the law to date but provides also a due measure of caution
by way of contemplation of effects ahead.
Id.
233. See supra Part II.B.3.
234. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 904.
So far as we are aware, every opinion and every order of any court in
this country, at least of any appellate court, is available to the public.
You may have to walk into a clerk's office and pay a per-page fee, but
you can get the opinion if you want it.
Id.
235. This is not to suggest that Judge Arnold is wrong about "access" to the
unpublished opinion. Although the unpublished Christie case is not available
April 2001] 1291
LOYOLA OFLOSANGELESLA WREVIEW
In sum, Arnold's apparent solution would render limited publi-
cation effectively useless. For limited publication to be an effective
judicial time-saver, the judge must know that the decision is only of
value to the parties themselves, otherwise the same time and effort
required of a formal opinion will be used to write an unpublished
opinion, thus saving no time at all.236 Judges would undertake to
write unpublished opinions uncertain of their future use while attor-
neys would have a real incentive to scour whatever records they
could to find an unpublished precedent.
V. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE OF UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS
AND No-CITATION RULES
The crisis of volume that was the impetus for the modem ex-
periment with unpublished opinions is also a crisis of judicial under-
staffing. There simply are not enough judges to adequately deal with
the volume of appeals. In 1990, the Report of the Federal Courts
Study Committee to the Judicial Conference of the United States ob-
served that "[flilling the judiciary's current shortage of judgeships
will not solve the current crisis of volume, but not doing so will
make it demonstrably worse. ' '237  Ten years later, Judge Richard
Arnold is among a chorus of voices calling for the appointment of
additional judges. 238 If the national trend continues toward more
on-line, a simple phone call to the law library for the Eighth Circuit resulted in
a free copy of the Christie case by facsimile. There is an important difference,
however, between prior knowledge of an unpublished case and conducting
fresh research for an unpublished case on file with the clerk or library. In other
words, if the existence of Christie was not already well-known, there is little or
no possibility that a private litigant would ever find it. William Reynolds and
William Richman suggest that limited publication should be accompanied by a
subject matter index of recently decided unpublished opinions. See Reynolds
& Richman, Non-Precedential Precedent, supra note 53, at 1205.
236. See supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
237. 1990 REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 36, at 112; see also
POSNER, supra note 17, at 129 (arguing that not enough judges have been
added to the federal court system).
238. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 904 ("It is often said among judges that the vol-
ume of appeals is so high that it is simply unrealistic to ascribe precedential
value to every decision .... The remedy... is to create enough judgeships to
handle the volume . . . ."). President Clinton declared that the failure of the
Senate to fill judicial vacancies placed the federal appellate courts in "a state of
emergency." See Clinton Renews Judgeship Battle, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2001,
at A20; Enough Already--Keep This Judge, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2001, at B8.
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litigation and more appeals, maintaining the currently flawed system
of limited publication is not going to remedy the situation.
It is especially interesting to note that the only empirical study
of limited publication has shown that there is no positive correlation
between unpublished opinions and judicial productivity.239  Pre-
sumably, limited publication does save time, as evidenced by the in-
ferior quality of the unpublished opinions. Unfortunately, however,
those short-term savings do not result in a net gain that either ade-
quately or fairly chips away at the mountain of opinions that need to
be written. Judge Richard Posner has shown that through the system
of limited publication, the courts have really attempted to cope with
the caseload explosion by reducing the quality of their opinions.
240
The most egregious form of this is the judgment order which con-
tains no rationale for a court's decision.
Defenders of limited publication admit that the system is flawed.
Robert Martineau has argued, for example, that the problems of lim-
ited publication stem from three primary causes: (1) lack of a fail-
safe system to ensure that all precedential opinions are published; (2)
failure to strictly enforce the no-citation rules; and (3) the prevalence
of unpublished opinions in computer databases.
24'
It is especially difficult to propose a single solution to the prob-
lems of limited publication. This is largely because each circuit has
Within weeks of the Anastasoffdecision, the case was used to support renewed
calls for the appointment of additional judges within New Jersey. See All
Opinions Are Precedential, N.J. L.J., Sept. 4, 2000, available at LEXIS, News
Library, N.J. L.J. File.
239. See Reynolds & Richman, An Evaluation, supra note 13, at 596-97
(concluding that their study "provide[s] no support for the hypothesis that lim-
ited publication enhances productivity").
240. See POSNER, supra note 17, at 124.
241. See Martineau, supra note 59, at 145; see also Martin, supra note 40, at
194-95. Chief Judge Boyce F. Martin, Jr., of the Sixth Circuit, has argued in
favor of strict no-citation rules. Martin suggests that the Sixth Circuit rule,
which states that unpublished opinions are "disfavored" is unacceptably am-
biguous. See Martin, supra note 40, at 194. Instead, Martin argues that liti-
gants should be informed that "unpublished opinions have no precedential
value and are not even the least bit persuasive." Id. at 194-95. Strict limits on
the citation of unpublished opinions would "eradicate most of the lingering in-
equity in the system." Id. at 195. The inequity Martin refers to comes from
the unequal access to unpublished opinions. See id. Robert Martineau has
recommended that the no-citation rule be strictly enforced against the parties
and the court itself. See Martineau, supra note 59, at 149.
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experimented with its own rules governing citation. If, however,
limited publication is to remain, courts would be wise to put in place
safety measures to better ensure that no precedent-setting opinion
goes unpublished.
242
Universal publication makes more sense in the digital age than
ever before.243 For example, the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern
District of California has placed all of its decisions on-line in a
searchable format. 24 4 The no-citation rules which are critical to the
effective operation of the limited publication system seem remarka-
bly unfair to litigants, especially when unpublished opinions are, in
fact, already widely available through online search services. Con-
sider the analogy between unpublished opinions and children, made
by Chief Judge Boyce F. Martin, Jr., of the Sixth Circuit: like chil-
dren, unpublished opinions are "best seen but not heard., 245 Courts
will continue to issue unpublished decisions, Martin wrote, "but we
do not want to hear them being cited back to us." 246 The widespread
availability of unpublished opinions is frustrating when engaging in
legal research. An on-line search may yield a bounty of opinions, in-
cluding published and unpublished cases alike. The diligent lawyer
needs to cite prior cases most on point for the client's interests. Yet,
like forbidden fruit, unpublished opinions will tempt, if not ruin a
case when cited before the wrong court.
While the potential for judicial abuse of limited publication ex-
ists, the more likely problem is the innocent overuse of the system.
In most cases, this likely stems from a failure to follow publication
guidelines. On a more fundamental level, however, the decision not
242. Robert Martineau has suggested that preventive internal reviews and
corrective actions after a problem occurs should be available in order to ensure
that publication guidelines are adhered to. See Martineau, supra note 59, at
146.
243. See, e.g., 1990 REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 36, at
130-31 (stating that although universal publication has problems of its own,
"inexpensive database access and computerized search technologies may jus-
tify revisiting the issue").
244. See J. Wylie Donald & Pamela Keyl, Litigation Practicalities of Un-
published Decisions, Practitioners Should Expect to See Briefs Citing More
Unpublished Decisions, and Judges Paying More Attention to Them, N.J. L.J.,
Dec. 4, 2000, available at LEXIS, News Library, N.J. L.J. File.
245. Martin, supra note 40, at 197.
246. Id.
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to publish a particular case flows from an early attempt to predict
precedential value. Given the judge's inability to predict that value,
the decision not to publish and the subsequent denial of precedential
value are thus based on a systematic flaw rooted in the core of lim-
ited publication. This begs the question whether publication guide-
lines could ever be genuinely effective.
VI. CONCLUSION
While the constitutionality of unpublished opinions remains an
open question within the Eighth Circuit, it is unlikely that other
courts will follow Judge Arnold's reasoning upon an examination of
the historical record. Leaving the question open, however, keeps the
debate surrounding limited publication alive. Limited publication
was initiated as an experiment within the federal courts. The oppor-
tunity to collect data from the various circuits, each with its own set
of rules, was welcomed information. The time for a careful re-
examination has arrived.
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